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Abstract
Research summary: Research documents the perfor-
mance effects of attending to shareholders and treating
employees well but underplays national differences in
the relative power of labor and capital. We advance a
configurational perspective that acknowledges the fit
between stakeholder engagement, context, firm attri-
butes and performance. As a cornerstone of this per-
spective, we develop a typology of stakeholder
engagement strategies expressing how firms navigate
the tension between conforming with local expecta-
tions—by prioritizing shareholders or employees,
according to context—and being distinctive—by
diverging from their peers. Analyzing a cross-national
sample of firms from 2004 to 2011, we identify combi-
nations of engagement strategies, firm attributes, and
contexts linked to high performance. Our findings
highlight the multiple context-dependent paths, which
link stakeholder engagement to high firm performance.
Managerial summary: How do firms navigate pres-
sures from shareholders and employees across different
institutional environments? We develop a typology of
stakeholder engagement strategies based on how firms
in different countries strike a balance between confor-
mity (i.e., prioritizing locally important stakeholders)
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and differentiation (i.e., prioritizing stakeholders that
their local peers might neglect). Our findings show that
the engagement strategies associated with high perfor-
mance vary according to local institutional context and
firm characteristics. In particular, by not merely priori-
tizing stakeholders who are already locally important,
firms can use stakeholder engagement to differentiate
themselves from their peers, and such engagement
strategies are often linked to high performance.
KEYWORD S
configurational theory, institutional theory, qualitative comparative
analysis, stakeholder theory, varieties of capitalism
1 | INTRODUCTION
Institutions—“the rules of the game in a society or….the humanly devised constraints that
shape human interaction” (North, 1990, p. 3)—both constrain and empower actors and activi-
ties (Scott, 2001). Institutions linked to the stakeholder groups of labor and capital are of high
importance for firms (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Ahmadjian & Robbins, 2005), and the relative
importance of these two stakeholder groups is the core distinction between market-driven and
coordinated institutional systems. In market-driven institutional systems, firms are reliant on
equity financing and have access to flexible labor markets, and the state enshrines firms' fidu-
ciary duty to their shareholders in law. In coordinated institutional systems, firms rely on long-
term bank-based financing, provide greater employment security for their employees, and the
state restricts employers' rights to unilaterally change employment terms. These cross-national
differences in labor relations and the working of capital markets shape firms' relationships with
their shareholders and employees (Coates, 2005; Hall & Soskice, 2001; Witt & Jackson, 2016).
It is common for competing interests to produce tensions between labor and capital (Coff, 1999;
Falato & Liang, 2016). Market-driven and coordinated institutional systems represent institutional
attempts to address these conflicts, but within both types of environments firms retain some discre-
tion in how they allocate resources among stakeholders (Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997). For exam-
ple, firms might use employment quality initiatives to attract talent (Bode, Singh, & Rogan, 2015) or
governance initiatives to raise new capital (Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick, 2003). Firms with limited
resources must typically choose between such initiatives, and performance outcomes are likely to
be sensitive to the institutional context in which a firm operates (Barnett, 2007). Prior research has
assessed the consequences of employee treatment (Edmans, 2011) or governance reform (Tuschke
& Sanders, 2003) on firm performance. Although this research has provided important insights, it
has generally studied each aspect in isolation (e.g., initiatives for labor or capital) and in a single
institutional setting (e.g., the United States or Germany). Therefore, the existing literature does not
enable insights into how firms across different contexts simultaneously address pressures from labor
and capital, and how doing so impacts their performance.
Addressing this gap in the literature, our study's research question is as follows: under
which institutional and firm-level conditions are different stakeholder engagement strategies
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linked to high financial performance? Our point of departure is the importance of fit between
strategy and context. We develop a typology of engagement strategies that combines two theo-
retical premises: (a) that institutional contexts generate rules and norms that shape stakeholder
engagement and (b) that these norms create opportunities for distinct strategies. The combina-
tion of these two premises is vital because firms perform well when they are sufficiently differ-
ent from competitors while also conforming to local expectations (e.g., Deephouse, 1999;
Phillips & Zuckerman, 2001; Zhao, Fisher, Lounsbury, & Miller, 2017). Accordingly, our typol-
ogy holds that firms can focus their stakeholder engagement: (a) on activities that complement
local institutional arrangements (“complementary engagement”), (b) on stakeholders that are
of lesser importance locally (“substitutionary engagement”), (c) on adhering to minimal institu-
tional requirements (“minimalist engagement”), or (d) on activities that both complement and
substitute for their institutional environments (“encompassing engagement”). Building on this
typology, we develop a configurational model that recognizes that firm's stakeholder engage-
ment strategies are linked to performance in combination with firm-level factors, such as the
degree to which maintaining the firm's business is dependent on support from employees and
from shareholders.
To study this configurational model, we use fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis
(fsQCA; Ragin, 2000, 2008). This approach enables us to assess how distinct stakeholder
engagement strategies are linked to firm performance under different firm-level and institu-
tional conditions. With a data set of 122 firms across 13 countries for the period from 2004 to
2011, we identify five configurations of stakeholder engagement and institutional context that
are consistently linked with high performance. These configurations capture different condi-
tions in which substitutionary, minimalist, or encompassing engagement strategies are linked
to high performance, whereas no configuration linked to high performance involves a comple-
mentary engagement strategy. Accordingly, our central contribution is to demonstrate that,
beyond the normative stakeholder management defined by national institutions, firms may pur-
sue one of a number of engagement strategies. Our findings highlight a key role for strategy,
contingent on institutional context and firm-level factors, in linking stakeholder engagement to
financial performance. Scholars have called for researchers to take into account environmental
complexity in order to understand how firms manage the tension between conformity and dif-
ferentiation (Zhao et al., 2017). By assessing a range of environments, we find that, rather than
pursuing a single “optimally distinct” strategy that strikes a balance between conformity and
differentiation, firms can pursue other engagement strategies that fit their particular context.
2 | THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
The management of stakeholders—groups or individuals “who can affect or [are] affected by
the achievement of the organization's objectives” (Freeman, 1984, p. 46)—is a crucial element
of strategy. Research on the relationship between stakeholder management and firm perfor-
mance (Margolis, Elfenbein, & Walsh, 2007; McWilliams & Siegel, 2001; Orlitzky, Schmidt, &
Rynes, 2003) is inconclusive, which suggests that it is neither simple nor universal. Accordingly,
we build on recent research emphasizing firm performance as the outcome of a complex, multi-
level process (Fiss, 2007, 2011; Misangyi et al., 2017), dependent on both firm strategy and its
institutional environment. The resulting configurational model considers the joint effects of
country- and firm-level dimensions to explore the implications of how firms attend to stake-
holder groups representing labor and capital. We focus on employees and shareholders as the
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core factors of production (Cobb & Douglas, 1928) and key actors in the institutional environ-
ment (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003). Our model is depicted in Figure 1 and described in detail
below. We first discuss differences in institutional contexts as the backdrop for firm action. We
then outline a typology of stakeholder engagement strategies that firms can pursue. Finally, we
discuss firm-level factors that promote a focus on specific types of stakeholders.
2.1 | National institutional contexts and stakeholder engagement
strategies
The varieties of capitalism literature synthesizes institutional differences across countries into two
ideal types: liberal market economies (LMEs) and coordinated market economies (CMEs) (Hall &
Soskice, 2001; Judge, Fainschmidt, & Brown, 2014). In LMEs, firms rely on market-based arrange-
ments for coordination and financing, the fiduciary duty toward shareholders has legal and norma-
tive force, and interfirm relationships are characterized by arm's-length exchanges. The United
States and the United Kingdom are the countries closest to this ideal type. In CMEs, banks are an
important source of financing, and shareholders are only one of a variety of stakeholders protected
by corporate law, which grants employees particular importance (Jürgens, Naumann, &
Rupp, 2000). Firms in CMEs use extensive nonmarket mechanisms for coordination and rely more
on relational approaches than firms in LMEs. Germany, Austria, and Norway are the countries
closest to this ideal type, although market-based coordination has become increasingly important in
several CMEs, including Germany and Denmark (Hall & Thelen, 2009; Rose & Mejer, 2003).
The differences between capitalist regimes have vital implications for stakeholder engage-
ment (Kang & Moon, 2011; Matten & Moon, 2008) and its link to performance. First, institu-
tional contexts generate rules and norms that influence which stakeholders are accorded
importance (Ioannou & Serafeim, 2012; Maignan & Ralston, 2002). In LMEs, shareholders are
supported more strongly than employees, whereas the opposite is found in CMEs. Second, by
shaping stakeholder expectations, the rules and norms prevalent in a particular context create
distinct opportunities that affect the financial outcomes of a given stakeholder engagement
strategy. However, although national institutions and their dominant norms influence organi-
zational action and the reactions of stakeholders (Brammer, Jackson, & Matten, 2012), firms
have discretion in the choices they make regarding their stakeholder relationships (Barnett &
Salomon, 2012; Tantalo & Priem, 2016).
FIGURE 1 Configurational model.
The dashed lines between institution-
level and firm-level drivers of
engagement and firm performance
represent direct (as opposed to
configurational) relationships that are
not the focus of our study
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The tension between firms' needs to comply with their institutional environment and to dis-
tinguish themselves presents firms with a choice to complement or substitute for the institutional
context when designing stakeholder engagement strategies. For instance, the Norwegian context
provides strong institutional support for employees, reflected in norms around long-term hiring
and workers' board representation. Shareholders are only one of several important stakeholder
groups. Thus, Norwegian firms may pursue complementary stakeholder engagement by focusing
on serving the interests of locally dominant stakeholders, that is, employees. Alternatively, they
may pursue substitutionary stakeholder engagement by focusing on the interests of stakeholders
of relatively lower importance in this institutional context, that is, shareholders.
Based on these two strategic options, two additional stakeholder engagement strategies can
be identified. First, firms may pursue a minimalist approach by not undertaking substantive
stakeholder engagement activities for any stakeholders. For Norwegian firms, this would entail
not undertaking additional activities to serve either shareholders or labor. Second, firms may
pursue an encompassing approach by focusing on both the emphasized and less-supported
stakeholders in their institutional context. For Norwegian firms, this would entail undertaking
activities targeted toward both shareholders and labor. These four strategies are summarized in
Table 1 and are elaborated on below.
2.2 | Complementary stakeholder engagement
Firms may exploit complementarities between their activities and dominant institutional forces.
For example, in the United States, a country with strong capital institutions, firms may gain
superior access to capital and consequently improve their performance by paying above-average
attention to shareholder rights (Gompers et al., 2003). However, evidence suggests that even
many high-performing firms place some restrictions on shareholder power (Gompers
et al., 2003). Whereas practices conforming to institutional norms promote organizational sur-
vival (Zucker, 1987), they do not as a rule produce superior financial returns. Firm-level factors,
such as local visibility (Phillips & Zuckerman, 2001), act as boundary conditions.
2.3 | Substitutionary stakeholder engagement
Firms may alternatively direct their engagement to stakeholders that are relatively overlooked
by local institutions (Jackson & Apostolakou, 2010). For example, in contexts featuring weak
institutional protection of labor, activities tailored to employee welfare enable firms to differen-
tiate themselves from their competitors. Thus, firms may benefit from improving working
TABLE 1 Typology of stakeholder engagement strategies
Low complementary
stakeholder engagement
High complementary
stakeholder engagement
Low substitutionary
stakeholder engagement
Minimalist stakeholder
engagement strategy
Complementary stakeholder
engagement strategy
High substitutionary
stakeholder engagement
Substitutionary stakeholder
engagement strategy
Encompassing stakeholder
engagement strategy
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conditions even when doing so is not locally mandated (Edmans, Li, & Zhang, 2014). Con-
versely, some firms in countries where institutions have historically provided stronger support
to labor than shareholders implement stronger governance and protection of shareholder rights
(Ahmadjian & Robbins, 2005; Fiss & Zajac, 2004) in the hope of raising capital.
2.4 | Minimalist stakeholder engagement
Firms following a minimalist approach do not undertake stakeholder engagement activities
beyond those that are legally mandated. For example, in hybrid institutional contexts that com-
bine norms supporting shareholder rights with strong employee rights (Kogut & Ragin, 2006),
firms may decide to forego the diminishing marginal benefit of investing additional resources to
attend to the interests of either shareholders or labor (for similar arguments, see Garcia-Castro
& Francoeur, 2016, and Husted & de Jesus Salazar, 2006).
2.5 | Encompassing stakeholder engagement
An encompassing stakeholder-engagement approach simultaneously focuses on activities that
complement and substitute for firms' institutional contexts; for example, by undertaking activi-
ties to serve both shareholders and labor. Indeed, stakeholder advocates originally called for
attentiveness to a broad range of stakeholders (Freeman, 1984). This strategy might be espe-
cially beneficial for firms exposed to high levels of scrutiny. For instance, firms that primarily
rely on their domestic market may face high expectations for conformity but may also benefit
from attending to stakeholders who are less-supported in their institutional contexts.
These four strategies reflect different approaches to achieving either relative conformity or
relative differentiation with respect to firms' institutional environments. A complementary
strategy denotes an approach to achieve relatively higher conformity by focusing on engaging
stakeholders supported by local institutions while not focusing on stakeholders neglected in
that institutional context. Conversely, a substitutionary strategy is an approach that emphasizes
achieving relatively higher differentiation by taking initiatives to focus on stakeholders not
supported by local institutions and by not focusing on stakeholders that are supported by them.
An encompassing strategy, focusing on both shareholders and employees, balances conformity
with differentiation by focusing on both stakeholders relatively neglected and supported by
local institutions. A minimalist strategy, focusing on neither shareholders nor employees,
strikes yet another kind of balance, by neglecting institutionally powerful stakeholders while
not devoting additional resources to institutionally neglected stakeholders. The latter two
instances correspond to compensatory orchestration (Zhao et al., 2017), which suggests that a
firm becomes “optimally distinct” by conforming on one dimension while differentiating on
another.
2.6 | Strategic drivers of stakeholder engagement
In addition to the opportunities for conformity and differentiation captured by our typology,
the outcome of stakeholder engagement activities also depends on firm-level drivers, such as
the degree to which a firm is dependent on support from employees and shareholders. We
6 GUPTA ET AL.
integrate three firm-level factors into our configurational model. These relate to pressure to attend
to employee and shareholder concerns, i.e., the need for specialized labor and the firm's owner-
ship concentration; and the extent to which the firm is embedded in its domestic institutional sys-
tem (i.e., internationalization). In selecting this parsimonious set of firm-level factors, we also
consider the empirical limits to the number of attributes to include in a research design utilizing
the set theoretic approach of qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) (Marx & Dusa, 2011).
2.7 | Need for specialized labor
Incentives for firms to address employee interests are shaped by their core activities (Datta, Guth-
rie, & Wright, 2005), which influence the extent to which they can rely on external labor markets
and generalist training systems. Firms engaging in high-technology activities require specialized
labor, and their focus on R&D characterizes the kind of employment they provide (Keeble, 1990).
Accordingly, high-tech firms stand to gain more from the increased retention and productivity
that results from superior employee treatment (Edmans et al., 2014; Miller, Lee, Chang, & Le
Breton-Miller, 2009). Employees are likely to reciprocate with additional effort, knowledge, and/
or inputs if they perceive that a firm acts fairly toward them (Bosse, Phillips, & Harrison, 2009).
Thus, for firms requiring specialist labor a focus on employee engagement may represent a
viable strategy. However, this stakeholder engagement strategy is not likely to provide the same
benefits for firms engaged in low-technology activities. For these firms, hiring low-skilled or
generalist employees and managing the mobility of this workforce is less challenging, and the
recruitment pool is wider. Where labor institutions are already strong, lower mobility and the
comparatively better conditions already offered to employees reduce the benefits that a firm can
derive from differentiating by means of employee initiatives. However, even in these contexts,
firms that have a higher need for specialized labor will gain more from attention to employees
than firms that are engaged in low-tech activities.
2.8 | Concentrated ownership
Not all firms need to be equally responsive to shareholders' interests. Ownership structure affects
not only a firm's performance (Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000), but also how it engages with stake-
holders, and especially its shareholders (Stavrou, Kassinis, & Filotheou, 2007). Because the inter-
ests of controlling and minority shareholders are often misaligned (Enrique & Volpin, 2007),
whether a firm has a few large owners or widely dispersed ownership affects its incentive to
improve minority shareholder rights (la Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000).
Firms with a large controlling ownership generally have less incentive than other firms to
focus on the interests of the wider body of shareholders or to pursue governance reform. By
curtailing the rights of minority shareholders, a few large shareholders can establish a high
degree of effective control, allowing them also to effectively expropriate minority shareholders
(la Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999). In addition, higher control by few shareholders
allows more effective monitoring of managers (Pagano & Röell, 1998). However, the outcome of
ownership concentration should be interdependent on firms' institutional environments: a lack
of shareholder protection provided by a country's institutional environment may present firms
with more opportunities to differentiate themselves and gain superior access to financing
(Gompers et al., 2003).
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2.9 | Internationalization
Many large firms eventually expand their activities beyond their home countries. Inter-
nationalized firms face differing pressures across distinct institutional contexts, which may
affect which stakeholders they attend to (Devinney, 2009; Durand & Jacqueminet, 2015) and
the performance outcomes of stakeholder engagement approaches (Campbell, Eden, &
Miller, 2012). Multinationals have greater discretion than firms that only operate domestically
because the former can more readily relocate activities when conforming to local norms is
costly (Scherer, Rasche, Palazzo, & Spicer, 2016). A priori, firms that rely on international mar-
kets face less pressure to conform locally because a global audience is unlikely to care whether
they meet standards set by their respective home country's institutional context. However,
highly internationalized firms also face overseas scrutiny, sometimes leading to engagement
activities for multiple stakeholders with the aim of being responsive across contexts
(Crilly, 2011).
3 | METHODS AND DATA
Our research design considers the interdependencies between country-level institutional and
firm-level factors by exploring how their combined impact is linked to firm performance.
Accordingly, we adopt fsQCA (Ragin, 2000, 2008) to identify configurations of stakeholder
engagement activities, national institutions, and firm-level factors that are linked to high perfor-
mance. This approach recognizes the potential for causal complexity underlying organizational
phenomena, including how multiple factors are together linked to an outcome (in the present
study, performance) and that there may be multiple pathways linked to a particular outcome
(Misangyi et al., 2017).
Using Boolean algebra and the logic of sets, fsQCA assesses each observation as a combina-
tion of attributes, and identifies the attribute configurations that are consistently linked to the
outcome of interest. Research in strategy (Bell, Filatotchev, & Aguilera, 2014; Crilly, Zollo, &
Hansen, 2012; Garcia-Castro & Francoeur, 2016; Grandori & Furnari, 2008; Greckhamer, 2016;
Misangyi & Acharya, 2014) and international business (Crilly, 2011; Greckhamer, 2011;
Pajunen, 2008) has utilized this approach to study how firm- and/or national-level attributes
influence organizational outcomes in combination, rather than independently.
3.1 | Sample and data
To construct our sample, we identified the 100 largest firms by market capitalization in 2012 in
each of 13 countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan, the
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. These
countries feature prominently in the comparative capitalism literature and are categorized as
LMEs or CMEs by Hall and Soskice (2001), although some of these countries combine elements
of the two ideal types (Kogut & Ragin, 2006). We obtained data for these firms from the Thom-
son Reuters ASSET4 database, which provides environment, social, and governance data (Hawn
& Ioannou, 2016) in the form of over 400 key performance indicators. Limited data availability
reduced our sample to 648 firms. Because the relationship between stakeholder engagement
and performance differs across industries (Garcia-Castro & Francoeur, 2016; Godfrey, Hatch, &
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Hansen, 2010), we narrowed our sample of firms to those in the industrials sector according to
their ASSET4 classification. We chose this sector because it had the largest number of firms
(149, or 23% of all 648 firms). This step enabled us to control for sector effects while retaining
institutional diversity. Additionally, the industrials sector is less regulated than other key sec-
tors such as finance and pharmaceuticals and is thus a suitable setting for observing agency in
firms' stakeholder engagement. After collecting and matching data to operationalize additional
attributes in our configurational model (i.e., firms' internationalization and ownership concen-
tration), our final sample comprised 122 firms for the period from 2004 to 2011, yielding a total
of 741 firm-year observations after accounting for missing observations.
3.2 | Data and set calibration
The first step in fsQCA is to define sets that represent outcomes (e.g., the set of high-performing
firms) and explanatory conditions (e.g., the set of firms with strong policies for protecting share-
holder rights). Through a process termed calibration (Ragin, 2000), each case is assigned a
degree of membership in each set. We applied the direct method of calibration (Ragin, 2008),
which requires the specification of three thresholds based on theoretical and/or empirical
knowledge—full membership (1), full nonmembership (0), and a crossover point of maximum
membership ambiguity (0.5)—in order to rescale interval variables into fuzzy sets, with the
intermediate step of calculating estimates of the log of the odds of full membership.1
3.3 | Outcome: firm performance
Our outcome of interest is firms' financial performance. In accordance with previous studies
(Johnson & Greening, 1999; Waddock & Graves, 1997), we operationalized firm performance as
return on equity (ROE) and collected ROE data from ASSET4. Although shareholders are ulti-
mately interested in firms' financial returns, it is noteworthy that efforts to attend to share-
holders are conceptually and empirically distinct from performance measures such as ROE. As
Core, Guay, & Rusticus (2006, p. 658) noted, “shareholder rights can have both negative and
positive effects on a firm's operating performance.” To calibrate the set of high-performing
firms, we used sample-dependent anchors to define set membership, consistent with our
explicit interest in these firms' performance relative to others. Specifically, the 80th percentile
was the anchor for full membership, the 20th percentile was the anchor for nonmembership,
and the median was the crossover point anchor.2 This is appropriate because for both financial
and social dimensions of performance, analysts regularly pinpoint the highest and lowest quin-
tiles to represent high and low performance, respectively (McKnett, 2015; Trunow & Lin-
der, 2015). Because our sample encompasses the period of the 2008 financial crisis, we
calibrated the whole sample using different thresholds pre- and postcrisis to adjust for its
effects; that is, we calibrated separately for the periods 2004–2007 and 2008–2011. We lagged all
1Following common practice to avoid theoretical and methodological difficulties of analyzing sets with membership
scores of exactly 0.5, we added a 0.001 constant to all such scores (Fiss, 2011; Ragin, 2008).
2Although our data set comprised the largest sector (industrials) in the ASSET4 data set, we used the entire sample of
firms across all sectors in the same 13 countries to inform our calibration thresholds. Because calibration maps absolute
values onto a relative scale of membership in a given set, using the larger overall sample for calibration ensures that the
sets more accurately depict the underlying performance measures.
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longitudinal attributes by 1 year compared to performance in order to attenuate reverse causal-
ity concerns.
3.4 | Stakeholder engagement
We collected data on firms' stakeholder-focused activities from ASSET4. In accordance with our
theorizing, we selected attributes reflecting attention to the two central stakeholder groups,
employees and shareholders, and operationalized these with two measures for employment
quality and shareholder rights from ASSET4, respectively. A firm's emphasis on employment
quality is measured by ASSET4 by jointly considering the answers to the questions: “Does the
company have a competitive employee benefits policy or ensuring good employee relations
within its supply chain?” and “Does the company have a policy for maintaining long term
employment growth and stability?” A firm's emphasis on shareholder rights is measured using
the question: “Does the company have a policy for ensuring equal treatment of minority share-
holders, facilitating shareholder engagement, or limiting the use of anti-takeover devices?”
ASSET4 measures weigh and z-score all data points against all companies included in the
ASSET4 database. Thus, ASSET4 stakeholder engagement measures are inherently relative,
which is appropriate for our analysis because the benefits a firm derives from its stakeholder
engagement are relative to, rather than independent from, other firms, who compete for both
employees and investment. A firm would score highly if, unlike other firms, it had a strong pol-
icy for attending to a focal stakeholder; similarly, a firm's score would be low if, unlike other
firms, it did not have a policy for attending to a focal stakeholder.3 Thus, ASSET4 determines a
focal firm's score by comparing its activities to those of all other firms in its industry (for calcu-
lating employment quality) or country (for calculating shareholder rights). As above, we cali-
brated the sets of firms with strong emphasis on shareholder rights and employment quality
using sample-anchored thresholds corresponding to the 80th percentile for full membership,
median for the crossover point, and 20th percentile for null membership. We again used data
for the entire sample and calibrated separately for pre- and postcrisis periods.
3.5 | National institutional contexts
We captured institutional context through the strength of a country's capital markets and labor
institutions. We captured the strength of labor institutions through two attributes of a country's
labor unions—union density and union authority—because unions define norms toward labor
by influencing wage negotiations (Checchi & Garcia-Peñalosa, 2010), job security (Atanassov &
Kim, 2009), and profitability expectations (Lee & Mas, 2012). We operationalized union density
using the ratio of union members to a country's working population (wage and salary earners)
in a given year, using data sourced from the OECD.stat database (OECD, n.d.). We
operationalized union authority using measures of the degree of authority of unions over work-
places from the Database on Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State
Intervention, and Social Pacts (Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies, 2013). This
3The calculation was based on the formula: score = (no. of firms with a worse value + (no. of firms with the focal firm's
value/2))/total no. of firms. For instance, in a sample of 15 firms, if only the focal firm has a policy for shareholder
rights, its score would be calculated as follows: (14 + (1/2))/15 = 0.9667.
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database includes an index scored from 0 to 1 that captures multiple dimensions of union
authority, including control over bargaining, appointment of workplace representatives, strike
funds, and enterprise strikes. We directly adopted the union authority index as a set ranging
from 0 to 1. Union density was calibrated using sample-anchored thresholds of the 80th percen-
tile, median, and 20th percentile for full membership, the crossover point, and null member-
ship, respectively. We created a higher-order set for a country's labor strength by averaging
membership in these two sets.
We operationalized the strength of countries' capital markets by integrating two measures:
its stock turnover ratio and its score on the Guillén–Capron minority shareholder protection
(GCMSP) index. A country's stock turnover ratio—the value of domestic shares traded divided
by their total market capitalization—denotes market strength (Hall & Gingerich, 2009) and
defines norms around corporate governance (Jackson & Deeg, 2008). We sourced these data
from the World Bank's (n.d.) data catalog. The GCMSP index reflects countries' norms and legal
provisions pertaining to minority shareholder rights, focused on the 10 legal provisions consid-
ered most relevant to their protection (Guillén & Capron, 2016). Minority shareholder rights
are conducive to capital markets and strong capital interests (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003). We
obtained GCMSP index data from the cross-national, longitudinal data set of Guillén and
Capron (2016). Both measures were calibrated using sample-anchored thresholds of the 80th
percentile, median, and 20th percentile for full membership, the crossover point, and null mem-
bership, respectively. We then constructed the higher-order set of countries with strong capital
markets by averaging the calibrated values for these two sets.
3.6 | Need for specialized labor
We captured firms' dependence on specialized labor by classifying firms as high- or low-tech,
based on prior findings in the literature that this attribute influences stakeholder engagement
(McWilliams & Siegel, 2000; Strike, Gao, & Bansal, 2006). High-tech firms require specialized
and high-skilled workers with sufficient talent to invent and commercialize new products, and
these firms therefore benefit from initiatives to hire and retain expert employees (Miller
et al., 2009). We used Hecker's (1999) classification of industries as high- or low-tech based on
Occupational Employment Statistics Survey data on the proportion of employees engaged in sci-
entific, technical, engineering, or R&D roles. We calibrated membership in the set of high-tech
firms by matching firms' three-digit Standard Industrial Classification codes to Hecker's classifi-
cation. This method classified 53 of 122 firms (319 of 741 firm-year observations) as “high-tech.”
Examples include Boeing, Babcock, and MTU Aero Engines; nonhigh-tech examples in our
sample include FedEx, G4S, and Randstad.
3.7 | Concentrated ownership
We calculated ownership concentration as the percentage of shares held by the largest share-
holder (Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000). We collected ownership data from the OSIRIS database
and calculated concentration by considering the largest shareholder's holding (the larger of
either direct or total shareholdings), excluding publicly quoted companies and unnamed private
shareholders, because these are “considered as unable to exert, as such, control over a com-
pany” (Osiris, n.d.). A typical upper threshold for ownership concentration is 20–25%, while a
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firm with below 5% ownership concentration may be considered management-controlled
(Atkinson & Galaskiewicz, 1988; Dam & Scholtens, 2013). Accordingly, we use theoretical
anchors corresponding to a single owner's 25% shareholding for full membership, 15% for the
crossover point, and 5% for null membership.
3.8 | Internationalization
Following prior studies (Sullivan, 1994), we measured a firm's internationalization as its foreign
sales as a percentage of total sales. We collected this data from the Worldscope database. We
calibrated this attribute using sample dependent anchors corresponding to the 80th percentile
for full membership, median for the crossover point, and 20th percentile for null membership.
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics and correlations for all variables used to calibrate attri-
bute sets. Table 3 reports descriptive statistics of the cross-country case distribution and coun-
tries' mean institutional scores in our observation period. The distribution of countries on scales
of capital and labor, created by averaging standardized values of GCMSP and stock turnover
ratio for capital and union density and union authority for labor, is depicted in Figure 2. Of the
741 total observations, 226 represent firms in countries typically classified as LMEs (Australia,
United States, and United Kingdom), and 515 represent firms in countries typically classified as
CMEs (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Swe-
den, and Switzerland). However, as Table 3 and Figure 2 show, our operationalization goes
beyond a binary dichotomy of LME/CME. For instance, Finland, Germany, and Sweden display
features of a hybrid context with strong labor institutions and comparatively strong capital insti-
tutions. Contexts with strong capital and weak labor institutions include not only the United
States and United Kingdom but also, unexpectedly, Japan.
3.9 | Analysis
Prior to conducting sufficiency analysis, we conducted necessity analyses to explore whether
any condition in our model was by itself necessary in order to obtain high financial perfor-
mance. A condition is necessary if it must be present for the outcome to occur (Ragin, 2008).
Consistency thresholds for necessity analyses are typically pegged above 0.90 (Greckhamer,
Furnari, Fiss, & Aguilera, 2018; Schneider & Wagemann, 2012), and a condition may be
deemed necessary if it has both high consistency and high coverage scores.
We conducted our sufficiency analysis using Ragin's (2008) fsQCA truth-table approach,
which constructs and analyzes a data matrix referred to as a “truth table” that includes 2k rows
(k = number of explanatory conditions; i.e., 27 = 128). Each row represents a logically possible
combination of conditions. Using Boolean algebra, the truth table is reduced into a simplified
expression of combinations linked to the outcome (Ragin, 2008). For this purpose, we set two
criteria: (a) a frequency threshold for the minimum number of cases that must belong to a com-
bination for it to be considered by the analysis and (b) a consistency benchmark to identify
combinations that are reliably linked to an outcome. We followed recommended levels
(Ragin, 2008) in choosing a raw consistency threshold of 0.85, supplemented by a 0.65 propor-
tional reduction in consistency (PRI) threshold following prior research (Greckhamer, 2016).
We chose a frequency cut-off of two cases, recommended by Ragin (2008) for relatively smaller
samples, but also run the analyses with alternative thresholds. As we document in Appendix 1,
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varying frequency and consistency thresholds to alternative levels within the recommended
bounds produced similar results to those presented here. We used the fsQCA 3.0 software
(Ragin & Davey, 2016) to conduct our analyses.
It is recommended that, upon completion of QCA analyses, researchers should return to
cases to interpret the essence of identified configurations (Greckhamer et al., 2018). Accord-
ingly, we collected qualitative data for cases representing each of the five configurations identi-
fied in our main analysis. We performed a content analysis of these cases using all available
Factiva sources and firm annual reports for the observation period that mentioned the firm and
contained the word(s) “employee(s),” “shareholder(s),” and/or “stakeholder(s).” This yielded
TABLE 3 Country-wise distribution and means of firm-year observations
Country
# of
observations
GCMSP
index
Stock
turnover
Union
density
Union
authority
Australia 50 6.75 90.34 19.65 0.30
Austria 25 5.06 53.96 30.68 0.60
Belgium 22 4.98 51.74 54.32 0.40
Denmark 34 3.00 86.44 68.44 0.50
Finland 46 6.05 130.40 70.50 0.50
Germany 75 6.22 148.34 20.07 0.70
Japan 132 7.00 127.23 18.50 0.10
Netherlands 44 4.68 150.46 19.53 0.70
Norway 8 4.93 124.80 54.01 0.70
Sweden 48 5.53 134.68 74.37 0.70
Switzerland 81 4.49 106.37 18.35 0.50
United States 78 7.25 221.96 11.79 0.60
United Kingdom 98 6.82 162.88 27.76 0.20
Australia
AustriaBelgium
Denmark Finland
Germany
Japan
Netherlands
Norway
Sweden
Switzerland
US
UK
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
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FIGURE 2 Distribution
of countries on standardized
scales for strength of capital
and labor institutions
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9,910 articles. In the first stage, our analysis was by firm. In the second stage, two researchers
assessed commonalities between those firms representing the same configuration.
4 | RESULTS
Necessity analyses found that neither the presence nor absence of any of the seven conditions
in our model is necessary for high performance, which reinforces the expectation of complex
causality. Table 4 presents the results of sufficiency analysis for high financial performance. We
follow the convention of using a configuration chart to report a combination of parsimonious
and intermediate solutions4 (Ragin & Fiss, 2008). Core conditions are those that are contained
in the intermediate and parsimonious solutions, while peripheral conditions are those that are
contained in the intermediate solution but not the parsimonious solution.5 In Table 4, black cir-
cles indicate the presence of a causal condition, whereas crossed circles indicate its absence.
Large circles indicate core conditions, whereas small circles indicate peripheral conditions. To
aid the interpretation of findings reported in Table 4, we summarize our qualitative insights in
Table 5 and incorporate them in our discussion of the results.
Table 4 shows that five configurations of stakeholder engagement, national institutions, and
firm attributes are consistently linked to high financial performance. These include substitu-
tionary (Configurations 1 and 2), minimalist (Configurations 3 and 5), and encompassing (Con-
figuration 4) stakeholder engagement strategies. No configuration links complementary
engagement strategy to high performance. Specifically, Configurations 1 and 2 show that a sub-
stitutionary engagement strategy is consistently associated with high performance in contexts
characterized by strong capital institutions (and, for Configuration 2 only, weak labor institu-
tions). Configuration 3 represents a minimalist engagement strategy in a context of strong capi-
tal and labor institutions, whereas Configuration 4 represents an encompassing engagement
strategy in the same context but pursued by different kinds of firms. Finally, Configuration 5
represents a minimalist engagement strategy in a context with strong capital institutions only.
Configuration 1, which we label as multinational, employee-first firms, is consistent with a
substitutionary engagement strategy. Engagement focused on employees rather than share-
holders is linked to high performance for highly internationalized firms headquartered in coun-
tries with strong capital institutions. This configuration is consistent with firms transcending
normative expectations in their home countries in order to incentivize skilled workers to join
and stay with them. In contrast, the institutional context in their home country already protects
investors, and firms in this configuration choose not to undertake further shareholder engage-
ment activities. As indicated in Table 5, some exemplar firms representing this configuration—
such as the successful conglomerates 3M (based in the U.S.) and Smiths Group (based in the
4The QCA's truth table algorithm for sufficiency analyses produces distinct parsimonious and intermediate solutions.
Intermediate solutions integrate simplifying assumptions that are consistent with empirical evidence at hand and with
existing knowledge regarding single conditions that compose logical remainders (i.e., “easy” counterfactuals);
parsimonious solutions may integrate both easy counterfactuals as well as difficult ones (i.e., those that are consistent
with the empirical evidence but not with theoretical knowledge; Fiss, 2011).
5The core-peripheral distinction builds on prior work in strategy and organization studies (e.g., Grandori &
Furnari, 2008; Hannan & Freeman, 1984) that has conceptualized core features as central features in an organization
that are surrounded by peripheral features that reinforce the core. Accordingly, QCA scholars view core conditions as
those with the strongest evidence linking them to the outcome of interest while peripheral conditions are those that are
linked to the outcome through weaker evidence (Fiss, 2011).
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U.K.)—have a history of conflict with activist investors, whose attempts to drive strategy are
resisted by these firms' executives.
Similar to Configuration 1, Configuration 2, which we label as balancing interests, under-
scores the tensions among stakeholders that link substitutionary engagement to high perfor-
mance. In a context of strong capital but weak labor institutions, for high-tech firms, focusing
on employees rather than shareholders is linked to high performance. Where formal institu-
tions do not support labor, our findings are consistent with the idea that high employment qual-
ity can facilitate retaining and motivating employees, especially for high-tech firms dependent
on specialized labor. Conversely, as shareholder rights are already protected in this context, fur-
ther shareholder-focused activities may not provide differential advantage. Qualitative evidence
shows that some exemplar firms representing this configuration—for example, the U.S.-based
Boeing and Raytheon, and the U.K.-based Babcock—perceive extensive pressure from
employees and struggle to balance attention to employees on the one hand and other stake-
holders such as shareholders and large government clients on the other (Table 5).
Configurations 3 and 4 both capture firms in hybrid institutional contexts that combine
strong labor and capital institutions, which implies high expectations from different stake-
holders toward firms (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003). However, they represent two distinct stake-
holder engagement strategies. Configuration 3, which we label as multinational Nordic players,
represents minimalist engagement, because it does not include the presence of any stakeholder
engagement activities. The combination of strong capital and labor institutions is found in some
European countries, such as Finland, Sweden, and Germany. In these hybrid contexts,
TABLE 4 Configurations for achieving high performance
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employees' and shareholders' interests are already reasonably well protected by institutions,
which potentially restricts the benefits of implementing further policies to serve these stake-
holders. Here, not focusing on activities aimed at shareholder rights is connected to high perfor-
mance for high-tech firms (a core condition) that are highly internationalized (a peripheral
condition). Additional qualitative evidence on the cases exemplifying this configuration shows
that some of these firms issue dual-class stock and rely on cross-shareholdings with strategic
partners (Table 5). Also, some of these firms have important government (e.g., Metso) or family
(e.g., Kone) ownership, which may insulate them from pressure to cater to short-term investors
or minority shareholders.
In contrast, Configuration 4, which we label as integrating stakeholder interests, represents
an encompassing stakeholder engagement strategy. In hybrid institutional contexts, for high-
tech firms (a peripheral condition) that lack concentrated ownership and internationalization, a
strategy of integrating shareholders' (peripheral condition) and employees' (core condition)
interests is linked to high performance. Qualitative evidence from Konecranes reinforces this
idea. This high-tech firm adopted multiple measures to align the interests of shareholders and
employees, such as providing stock options to employees, shifting to a two-tier management
structure, and investing in employee-focused training and retention activities. Konecranes artic-
ulated the importance of focusing on employees to boost its competitive advantage and short-
term performance, which is also important for attracting minority shareholders (Table 5). Fur-
ther comparing Configurations 3 and 4 suggests that in the hybrid institutional contexts they
represent, for international high-tech firms (i.e., Configuration 3), a minimalist strategy is con-
sistently linked to high performance; this may be the case because these firms may be shielded
from public scrutiny at home. On the other hand, an encompassing strategy that actively
attends to the rights of a broad set of stakeholders is linked to performance for domestically
focused high-tech firms with dispersed ownership that are exposed to local stakeholders' scru-
tiny (i.e., Configuration 4).
Configuration 5, which we label as partnering to overcome stakeholder pressures, represents a
minimalist engagement strategy. In a context of strong capital institutions, not investing
resources to engage with either employees or shareholders is consistently linked to high perfor-
mance for high-tech firms with concentrated ownership and low internationalization. This con-
figuration represents firms headquartered in Sweden and in Japan. Notably, the exemplar firms
belonging to this configuration often engage in strategic partnerships, including equity alli-
ances. For example, Volkswagen has a large equity stake in Scania (Sweden), and Isuzu (Japan)
collaborates closely with Toyota. Together, these features potentially limit the exemplar firms'
exposure to pressures from labor and shareholders because they give the firms wider access to
skills and capital.
4.1 | Subsample analyses
Table 4 represents stakeholder engagement strategies that are consistently linked to high finan-
cial performance across institutional contexts. We complemented these findings through sub-
sample analyses to identify the configurations linked to high financial performance within
LME, CME, and hybrid economies. Subsample analyses are useful in configurational studies for
developing insights about performance within rather than across contexts (Greckhamer, Mis-
angyi, Elms, & Lacey, 2008). For this purpose, we used data for country-institutions (see Table 3
and Figure 2) to split our sample into four subsamples as follows: (a) countries with strong
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capital but weak labor institutions; (b) countries with strong labor but weak capital institutions;
(c) countries with strong labor and capital institutions; and, finally, and (d) countries with weak
labor and capital institutions.
To analyze these subsamples, we included all attributes except those representing the
strength of labor and capital institutions, which were used to create the subsamples. For each
analysis, we chose a raw consistency threshold of 0.80, a PRI consistency threshold of 0.65, and
a frequency threshold of two cases, which corresponded to the inclusion of at least 96% of cases.
We report results for these analyses in Tables 6–9.
Table 6 shows the results for firms in countries with strong capital and weak labor institu-
tions (including the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, and Japan). We identify five
configurations consistently linked to high performance. As in the main results presented in
Table 4, both minimalist (Configurations 1 and 3) and substitutionary (Configuration 2) stake-
holder strategies are associated with high performance in this context in combination with
some firm-level attributes. In addition, an encompassing stakeholder engagement strategy
focused on both shareholders and employees is linked to high performance for inter-
nationalized low-tech firms with concentrated ownership (Configuration 4) or domestically-ori-
ented high-tech firms (Configuration 5).
Table 7 shows the results for firms in countries with strong labor and weak capital institu-
tions (including Austria, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway). This solution con-
tains only one configuration and a low overall coverage, which may suggest that the diversity of
institutional environments within the subsample and/or the diversity of firms in this subsample
is not represented as well by the included dimensions as are the other subsamples. In other
words, there may be various paths to high performance in these countries, but only one is con-
sistently linked to high performance. The single configuration in these results indicates that a
TABLE 6 Configurations for achieving high performance for sub-sample with strong capital and weak
labor institutions (including United States, United Kingdom, Australia, and Japan)
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lack of shareholder engagement is connected to high performance for low-tech firms that lack
ownership concentration and are not internationalized.
Table 8 shows the results for firms in countries with strong labor and capital institutions
(including Sweden, Finland, and Germany). This subsample analysis identified four configura-
tions that are consistently linked to high performance in this institutional context. As in the
main analysis, two configurations correspond to the minimalist stakeholder strategy (Configu-
rations 1 and 2), and one corresponds to an encompassing stakeholder strategy (Configuration
4). In addition, Configuration 3 indicates that attention to shareholders but not to employees
(peripheral conditions) is linked to performance for some firms with dispersed ownership. This
configuration represents a partially complementary stakeholder engagement approach that
complements the strong capital institutions (which have recently become strong) while not
complementing the traditionally strong labor institutions.
Finally, Table 9 shows the results for firms in an institutional environment that combines
both weak capital and labor institutions (i.e., Switzerland). We found four configurations con-
sistently linked to high performance in this subsample. However, this subsample includes only
one country, hence we interpret these results with caution as to their generalizability to other
countries with a similar institutional environment. These findings suggest that a stakeholder
engagement strategy focusing on employees but not on shareholders is linked to performance
in this context (Configuration 3), in combination with high internationalization and a low
dependence on specialized labor (both peripheral conditions). For firms that have a concen-
trated ownership base and a high dependence on specialized labor, focusing on shareholder
rights and employment quality (both peripheral conditions) is linked to high performance
(Configuration 4).
TABLE 7 Configurations for achieving high performance for sub-sample with strong labor and weak
capital institutions (including Austria, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway)
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TABLE 8 Configurations for achieving high performance for sub-sample with both strong capital and labor
institutions (including Sweden, Finland, and Germany)
TABLE 9 Configurations for achieving high performance for sub-sample with both weak capital and labor
institutions (including Switzerland)
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4.2 | Additional analyses
We performed sensitivity analyses for different calibration thresholds to those used in our main
analysis. We altered the anchors for full and null membership in a set from the 80th and 20th
percentiles to the 90th and 10th percentiles. As reported in Appendix 2, the results show minor
changes related to the number of configurations and solution coverage. We continue to observe
configurations that correspond to the substitutionary and minimalist engagement strategies. As
in the main analysis, we do not observe a complementary strategy linked to high performance.
We also do not observe an encompassing strategy linked to high performance; in our main anal-
ysis, this strategy recorded the lowest coverage. Finally, fsQCA does not assume causal symme-
try. Accordingly, in Appendix 3 we report the results of sufficiency analysis for the absence of
high financial performance and discuss the three configurations we found to be consistently
linked to this outcome; we also present an exemplar firm representing each of these
configurations.
5 | DISCUSSION
The primary contribution of this study is to advance a configurational perspective on stake-
holder engagement. Prior research documents the effects on performance of providing better
governance and better treatment of employees, respectively. However, by focusing on either of
these effects, often only in any one context, prior studies are unable to account for differences
in the relative power of labor and capital across nations. In this study, we develop a typology of
stakeholder engagement strategies to map different approaches firms can use to generate finan-
cial performance through engagement with labor and shareholders in different institutional
environments. Our typology proposes that firms can pursue stakeholder engagement in a man-
ner that is complementary, substitutionary, minimalist, or encompassing given their respective
institutional contexts (see Table 1). Guided by this typology, our analysis helps to unravel the
complexity underlying the link between performance and stakeholder engagement.
Crucially, we found that different engagement strategies are linked to high performance in
different contexts. In contexts with strong capital and weak labor institutions, a substitutionary
strategy is most salient in configurations consistently linked to high performance. In contrast,
in hybrid contexts characterized by both strong labor and capital institutions, under different
conditions, the extremes of minimalist and encompassing strategies are consistently linked to
high performance. Moreover, in our main analysis, we found that no configuration that is con-
sistently linked to high performance entails a complementary stakeholder engagement strategy
(see Table 4), which would focus on attending to the particular stakeholder group represented
by strong local institutions. This could be because institutionally supported stakeholders already
are in strong positions to get their demands fulfilled, a strategy based on focusing on those
stakeholders provides the least opportunity for successful differentiation, which reinforces the
idea that for stakeholder engagement more is not always better (Harrison & Bosse, 2013). Our
subsample analyses further identify the contexts in which specific strategies are consistently
linked to high performance.
From a strategic management perspective that emphasizes firms' desire to translate stake-
holder engagement into economic value (Wang, Choi, & Li, 2008), our findings imply that any
strategy may provide different value across different contexts because its results are dependent
on a combination of institutional and firm-level factors. Thus, the theoretical and empirical
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connections we forge between national institutions, stakeholder engagement, and financial per-
formance advance research at the interface of strategy and stakeholder theory (Tantalo &
Priem, 2016). Our configurational model informs efforts to disentangle the conditions under
which different forms of stakeholder engagement are linked to financial returns for firms
(Barnett, 2007; McWilliams & Siegel, 2001) across different contexts. Additionally, our qualita-
tive results (Table 5) provide nuance as to how different factors within a firm may combine to
create opportunities to benefit from stakeholder engagement. Similarities across firms in a par-
ticular configuration, captured by labels derived from the qualitative analysis, present new
pathways for scholars to explore at the intersection of strategy and stakeholder theory.
More broadly, firms' strategies to navigate tensions between labor and capital have implica-
tions for firms' efforts to balance the need for conformity—such as when they give attention to
a locally dominant stakeholder group—with the need to be distinct, and, consequently, for their
performance. Each engagement strategy in our typology represents a different approach to man-
aging tensions between conformity and differentiation. Research on comparative institutions
highlights the benefits accruing to coherent firm-level strategies appropriate to local contexts
(Hall & Soskice, 2001). From this perspective, there are benefits to conformity. However,
although coherence between the elements of an institutional system is consistent with compar-
ative advantage (Witt & Jackson, 2016), competitive advantage requires firms to differentiate
themselves from competitors. From this perspective, there are benefits to being distinct. Prior
research suggests striking an optimal balance between conformity and distinctiveness (Zhao
et al., 2017). Our typology and empirical investigation imply that this balance varies across
firms and contexts, and that, in many instances, firms benefit from emphasizing distinctiveness
rather than conformity, as encapsulated by the substitutionary engagement strategy.
Finally, our configurational perspective stands in contrast to much of the cross-national lit-
erature on governance insofar as it takes account of institutional and firm-level factors, as well
as performance differences across firms. The varieties of capitalism literature emphasizes
national political economies as the central determinants of how firms address coordination
problems. Though the ambition of the varieties of capitalism approach at its outset was to be
“actor-centered” in examining how firms address coordination problems (Hall & Soskice, 2001,
p. 6), the actor-centered perspective has remained underdeveloped. By acknowledging the
diverse strategies that exist within the same context, we underscore the relevance of actor-
centered explanations within the varieties of capitalism approach.
5.1 | Directions for future research
One direction for future research is suggested by our finding that substitutionary stakeholder
engagement is more salient than complementary engagement in configurations that are consis-
tently linked to high performance (as indicated by the high coverage scores of Configurations 1
and 2 and the absence of any configuration representing a complementary strategy in our solu-
tion). To date, the notion that firms substitute for weak institutions has been primarily applied
to institutional voids in emerging markets (Marquis & Raynard, 2015) that denote transaction
hazards due to opportunism and ineffective protection of property rights (Khanna & Pal-
epu, 2000). By extending the logic of institutional voids to the developed countries in our study,
we highlight that institutional systems develop in a way that privileges certain key actors (e.g.,
shareholders and equity-based financing in LMEs; banks and labor in CMEs), and thus develop
around locally-accepted answers to the question: “Who or what counts?” These expectations
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may create voids that leave other stakeholders' demands unmet and pose strategic challenges
and opportunities for firms.
As briefly noted above, a configurational model is limited in the number of attributes it can
include, due to the viable balance between model conditions and sample size (Marx &
Dusa, 2011) and the exponentially increasing complexity of a study's model and thus potentially
of its findings (Greckhamer et al., 2018). Future research could build on our study by exploring
further contingencies that explain the stakeholder engagement–financial performance relation-
ship. Such research may consider that some firms with exceptionally high or low status have
greater leeway to pursue a substitutionary engagement strategy (Phillips & Zuckerman, 2001).
To give another example, future research could take a different approach to ownership-related
attributes. Building on prior research (e.g., Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000), such research could go
beyond our consideration of ownership concentration by considering the importance of owner-
ship identities; indeed, qualitative evidence for Configuration 3 presented in this study suggests
that ownership identity may be relevant to the link between stakeholder engagement and high
performance for some firms.
Moreover, considering that returns from stakeholder engagement differ by industry (Flam-
mer, 2015), future research should further investigate industry-level contingencies that shape
firms' ability to capture value from their stakeholder engagement strategies. For example, the
natural resources sector is subject to substantial scrutiny, and its firms have particular need for
support from social actors (see Henisz, Dorobantu, & Nartey, 2014). Future research may also
consider other important stakeholders, such as firms' customers, stakeholders representing the
natural environment, and the state (Kollman & Prakash, 2001; Ortiz-de-Mandojana, Aguilera-
Caracuel, & Morales-Raya, 2014). Because the state shapes labor and capital institutions, it is
important to examine whether firms' stakeholder engagement (e.g., attending to employee con-
cerns in a context of strong capital institutions) engenders a reaction from the state.
National institutional systems are themselves constellations of factors that may be subject to
change and shaped by firms over time (Henisz & Zelner, 2003; Hillman, Keim, & Schuler, 2004).
As firms in CMEs begin to give greater privilege to shareholder rights, norms relating to the
appropriate standing of shareholders might change. Our analysis considers annual changes in
institutional contexts, but only over a relatively limited time period. We see potential value in
exploiting exogenous shocks as quasi-experiments in order to advance research in this domain.
For example, an increase in takeover protection has allowed U.S. managers to channel greater
attention to nonshareholding stakeholders (Kacperczyk, 2009). Accordingly, the increase in dis-
cretion stemming from lower danger of being disciplined by markets may foster a substitution-
ary engagement strategy. Future research could assess what kinds of firms use this newly
gained agency to adjust their stakeholder engagement activities. The advantages of this
approach notwithstanding, appropriate exogenous shocks that apply across different countries
are likely to be relatively rare, hence, this approach primarily lends itself to within-country
studies.
In this study we have adopted a configurational theoretical approach because it has the
capacity to address patterns across a variety of contexts and practices. FsQCA is well suited to
study complex phenomena such as how institution- and firm-level conditions in combination
are linked to superior performance. It is also suitable for identifying equifinal relationships,
such as when multiple stakeholder engagement strategies are associated with similarly superior
performance. Taking complexity and equifinality seriously, we used fsQCA to explore how insti-
tutional contexts and firm-level factors combine with firms' stakeholder engagement activities
to create patterns linked to high performance outcomes.
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However, we also note that even though a configurational approach such as QCA offers
benefits in helping scholars understand complex questions, they are not without limitations. In
particular, researchers should recognize that findings form QCA analyses provide empirical evi-
dence of association and accordingly they should exercise caution and theoretical rigor in draw-
ing causal inferences based on these findings from QCA analyses. Moreover, while reverse
causality and omitted variable bias are issues common to several analytical techniques, we note
that conventional quantitative methods have more formal tools to deal with them than QCA.
To build stronger evidence of causal relationships, future research may also complement our
cross-context configurational approach by performing in-depth qualitative within-case analysis
(Schneider & Rohlfing, 2013, 2016).
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